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Abstract
What are the sources of wage growth in developing countries? In the USA, general
labor market experience is the key source of wage growth, with job seniority playing
a smaller role. By contrast, in Indonesia, the 10-year return to seniority is 24 to 28 %,
which is higher than the return to experience. Furthermore, we estimate a 35 %
return to 10 years of tenure in the formal sector, with no significant return to tenure
in the informal sector. The difference in the sources of wage growth in Indonesia
versus the USA may be a reflection of Indonesia’s lower level of development.
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1 Introduction
Wage growth is tied to general and specific human capital accumulation (Becker, 1964).
To further analyze the role of specific human capital, labor economists have estimated
the returns to employer, occupation, and industry tenure. In the USA, pioneering work
by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) has used an instrumental variable strategy to correct for
endogeneity when estimating the returns to employer tenure. Subsequent work has
investigated the importance of industry, occupation, and employer-specific human capital
in determining wage growth (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Parent, 2000; Kambourov and
Manovskii, 2009). The most recent work concludes that general labor market experience
and occupation tenure are the most important contributors to wage growth in the USA
(Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Sullivan, 2010).
Little is known about how human capital accumulation affects wage growth in
developing countries. A dearth of adequate panel data with labor market histories is to
blame for this gap in the literature. This paper contributes to filling this gap by
estimating for the first time the returns to potential experience, employer tenure,
occupation, and industry in a developing country, Indonesia. Furthermore, when
investigating the sources of wage growth in developing countries, it is important to
consider the role of the informal sector as a factor that differentiates jobs. Indeed, in
developing countries, the informal sector typically employs a large share of the labor
force. While the share of workers employed informally is less than 10 % in developed
economies, it is as high as 60 % in the developing world (Bacchetta et al., 2009). A job
in the same occupation and industry may be quite different and require different skills
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depending on its formality status. For example, let us examine the case of a salesperson
in the retail industry. A formal salesperson job will typically be in a larger shop and will
consist of assisting wealthier customers and handling credit card purchases. In contrast,
an informal salesperson is likely to work on the street, trying to attract customers while at
the same time avoiding potential police harassment. More generally, we can expect formal
jobs to use a more modern, more capital intensive, production technology. The substan-
tial size of the informal sector and the distinctive characteristics of formal and informal
jobs imply that, in addition to employer, occupation, and industry, sector-specific human
capital is likely to matter in determining wage growth in developing countries.
Determining whether sector-specific human capital contributes to wage growth in
developing countries is important for two reasons. First, formality comes with social
benefits, such as minimum wage, health insurance, and pensions. Formal sector
workers have to pay taxes to enjoy these social benefits, so the formal sector is
unattractive for workers who value these benefits at less than their cost. In addition to
these tax disincentives to switching to formality, informal workers may lose their
sector-specific human capital when they switch to formality. On the other hand, formal
workers may choose to remain formal despite tax disincentives so as to benefit from
the returns to their formality-specific human capital. Therefore, estimating the
magnitude of sector-specific returns will improve our understanding of workers’ sector
attachment. Second, estimating the returns to sector tenure is also important to design
better public policies. Indeed, when informality is high, governments lose tax revenue
and state capacity is eroded. For these reasons, many governments in developing
countries are interested in policies that can increase formality. The presence of for-
mality and informality-specific human capital offers both challenges and opportunities
for the design of such policies. On the one hand, if there is informality-specific human
capital, it will be hard to persuade older informal workers to switch to the formal sector
and renounce the benefits of their informality-specific human capital. On the other
hand, positive returns to formality-specific human capital open the possibility that a
temporary subsidy to formality will yield a persistent long-run increase in formality.
In this paper, we estimate the returns to employer, occupation, industry, and sector
tenure in Indonesia. We use the instrument developed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
and used by Parent (2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) to estimate returns
to tenure using the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). The panel structure of the
data allows us to construct respondents’ employment history between 1988 and 2007.
We find that the 10-year return to employer tenure is 24 % and the returns to potential
experience are 18 %. Once we include occupation, industry, and sector tenure, we find
that the returns to employer tenure and potential experience remain significant and of
similar magnitude, while there is no significant return to sector tenure. However, when
we allow the returns in the formal sector to differ from the returns in the informal sec-
tor, we find that the returns are much higher in the formal sector. All else equal, the
10-year return to formal sector tenure is 35 %, while there is no significant return to
tenure in the informal sector.
This paper makes two key contributions to the literature. First, it provides the first
detailed estimates of the return to general and specific human capital for a developing
country using an estimation strategy that has been broadly used for developed coun-
tries. This allows us to compare the sources of wage growth across developed and
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developing countries. We find that, contrary to what was found for the USA (Altonji
and Shakotko, 1987; Altonji and Williams, 2005; Beffy et al., 2006; Sullivan, 2010), the
returns to employer tenure are higher than the returns to experience in Indonesia. The
fact that the returns to experience are lower in Indonesia than in the USA is consistent
with the broader pattern of lower returns to experience in poorer countries uncovered
by Lagakos et al. (2012). Furthermore, in Indonesia, the returns to employer tenure are
essentially unaffected if we allow for returns to industry and occupation tenure, which
is again different from the results found on US data (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009;
Sullivan, 2010). Second, we show that returns to formal sector tenure are very import-
ant and are in fact the most important source of wage growth in Indonesia. This result
suggests that workers in the formal sector enjoy substantially higher wage growth than
their informal counterparts. Policies aiming at increasing the formalization of the econ-
omy should take into account the high returns to formal sector tenure; this suggests
that incentives for formality should be targeted to younger workers to allow them to
acquire formality-specific human capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institu-
tional background. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 describes the estimation
strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Informality in Indonesia
It is important to distinguish between formal and informal jobs because the informal
sector plays an important role in developing economies like Indonesia. For the purpose
of our study, the distinction between formal and informal jobs is important because
jobs in the formal sector may require different skills than jobs in the informal sector. In
general, the informal sector has been defined in three ways. The International Labour
Organisation (ILO) and the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean
define the informal sector as the sum of non-professional self-employed, domestic
workers, unpaid workers, and workers in enterprises employing five or fewer workers
(Angelini and Hirose, 2004). Second, formal employment can be defined as employment
in a job where mandatory social security contributions are paid. Third, formal employ-
ment can be defined as employment in firms that are registered.
Indonesia’s National Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) uses an
enterprise-based approach to define informality. Formal sector enterprises are legal en-
tities of the form listed by the Ministry of Manpower.1 The legal status of a company/
unit of economic activity is based on the legal document prepared by a solicitor when
the company was established. Enterprises that are registered for tax purposes or operat-
ing permit but do not have the legal status in the definitions listed by the Ministry of
Manpower are considered informal. The share of the informal sector declined from al-
most 80 % in 1990 to 60 % right before the 1998 Asian economic crisis, and the share
of the informal sector has been about 65 % since 2000.2 According to a 2004 ILO report
(based on BPS estimates), about 55 million of the 90 million workforce are in the informal
economy, with the majority in agriculture. Excluding the agricultural sector, 47 % of the
workforce is in the informal sector. The formal economy is mainly comprised of the
following industries: government, mining, construction and utilities, and finance.
The Indonesian Ministry of Manpower (UU Ketenagakerjaan No. 13, 2003) defines
informal workers as those with no terms of employment in terms of salary and scope
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of the work. In terms of employment status, casual and unpaid workers are considered
informal, while self-employed workers may be in either sector depending on the legal
status of the enterprise. The majority of self-employed workers in Indonesia are
informal. Maloney (2004) summarizes the characteristics associated with informal self-
employment in developing countries. Self-employment in this setting often appears
voluntary. The evidence on the earnings of the informal self-employed is mixed. There
is some evidence that some workers earn more in informal self-employment than in
salaried employment (Blau, 1985). If not, the self-employed might value the independ-
ence, or they do not value the benefits associated with formal employment. We will
consider self-employment as part of the informal sector throughout the analysis
(see below for more details on how we define informal and formal jobs). Our data unfor-
tunately does not provide the registration status of workers’ enterprise, so self-employed
workers whose enterprise is registered would be misclassified. This assumption has been
made in other studies in Peru (Yamada, 1996) and Mexico (Maloney, 1999).
Workers in the informal sector in Indonesia are de facto not protected by labor laws
such as minimum wage and benefits. Benefits include additional income for major reli-
gious holidays, usually equal to workers’ monthly salary, and health benefits. Health
benefits may be in the form of medical allowances or health insurance. Medical allow-
ance gives workers some compensation for some medical expenses, but unlike health
insurance, the amount and coverage vary by employer. Health insurance coverage may
be obtained through the government or private insurance. The government has several
health insurance programs for the military, civil servants, private employees, and the
poor. The government manages a health insurance scheme for private employees under
the Employees Social Security System, Jamsostek.3 The organization was established in
1995 based on a social security law passed in 1992 (UU No. 3, 1992). Jamsostek volun-
tary enrolment is available to all workers, including informal workers, but this is rarely
taken up. As part of the social security law, beginning in 1993, the government man-
dates employers with more than 10 employees or a monthly payroll exceeding one
million Rupiah (approximately USD 110) to provide health benefits through Jamsostek.
However, employers may opt out from the scheme by providing comparable or better
health benefits. The rule is not strictly enforced, especially for non-registered enter-
prises or formal enterprises that declare workers as contractors. To extend benefits to
the informal sector, the National Social Security System Act, effective from 2004,
mandates employers, including the government, to provide social health insurance. The
law provides a framework for the development of social security and social assistance
to ultimately phase in universal health coverage. However, the health benefits require-
ment is also not strictly enforced.4 Without knowing the legal status of the enterprise,
formality in Indonesia can be defined using employment status, the presence of health
benefits, and firm size.
3 Data
We use all four waves of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). The first wave was
conducted in 1993, followed by the second wave in 1997, the third wave in 2000, and
the fourth one in 2007. The IFLS is the representative of the Indonesian population
living in 13 of the nation’s 26 provinces in 1993. These 13 provinces represent 83 % of
the population.5 The IFLS contains rich information on household and individual
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characteristics. Individual characteristics include date of birth, education, marital status,
employment status, and characteristics, as well as retrospective employment history.
The employment history includes detailed information on first employment and in-
come. Income is broken down into wages and other payments, which include medical
benefits and allowances. IFLS1 (1993) included 7224 households. Subsequent waves of
the survey sought to re-interview all households in IFLS1 as well as split-off house-
holds. Nearly 91 % of IFLS1 households were interviewed in all waves. The high re-
interview rates lessen the risk of bias due to non-random attrition.
Following the existing literature on the returns to human capital using panel data,
the sample is restricted to male individuals who were ever employed between 1988 and
2007 (since the survey collects respondents’ employment history from 1988). We only
include male individuals in the analysis because of the selection into labor market par-
ticipation. Specifically, opportunities in the labor market for men and women tend to
be different in developing countries (Mammen and Paxson, 2000). In our sample,
women are less likely to have ever worked (68 % for women vs. 77 % for men) and
when women work, they work fewer hours than men (36.4 h for women vs. 41.3 h for
men). We also restrict the sample to respondents with urban residence because rural
residents are much more likely to be in agriculture, hence in the informal sector, and
we are interested in returns to sector tenure where both sectors are indeed present.
Respondents in the analyzed sample were present in at least two consecutive surveys,
so we could construct respondents’ employment spells in the intervening years. Follow-
ing Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), we exclude respondents who worked less than
500 h or had total earnings of zero in a given year. We also exclude those who reported
ever being in the military or ever being in agriculture. Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009) also exclude those who ever reported self-employment. We do not exclude “ever
self-employed” since self-employment is very common in Indonesia (about 45 % of
(person-year) observations in our sample are self-employed). We only exclude those
who were “currently self-employed”. The rationale for excluding the currently self-
employed is that wage determination is different in salaried jobs compared to self-
employed jobs and wages in self-employment may not reflect productivity in the same
way as wages in salaried positions.
We define occupations and industries using the one-digit code used in the IFLS. The
dataAppendixcontains the description of the occupation and industry codes.6 Respon-
dents’ occupation and industry came from the employment module, including the
retrospective questions in each survey wave. We identify an employer change when
respondents indicated that they were not on the same job as the previous year. We
then construct employer and industry tenure based on these employer changes.
Occupation may change within a spell with the same employer. A more detailed
explanation is available in the data Appendix.
Participation in the formal labor market is difficult to identify because our dataset does
not contain information on the registration status of the employer. Formality is also a con-
tinuum, and smaller firms are more likely to be informal or partially informal (Perry et al.,
2007). We construct sector participation based on several variables. Our preferred variable
uses information on medical benefits and firm size, and it separates informal workers into
self-employed and salaried informal workers. Even though both self-employed workers and
salaried informal workers are in the informal sector, there is evidence that urban self-
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employed workers differ in their observed characteristics and have higher earnings than
their salaried counterparts (Blau, 1985). The earnings of the self-employed in our dataset
are also higher than their salaried counterparts. In addition, the self-employed are older,
more likely to be married, and are less educated than salaried workers.
We construct our preferred indicator for informality using a combination of medical
benefits and firm size. The availability of medical benefits best captures the concept of
formality as firms complying with regulations. However, we do not always observe
whether medical benefits are available in the data, so we supplement the informality
definition based on medical benefits with a definition based on firm size. Indeed, lack
of social benefits and small firm size have been shown to be correlated in other devel-
oping countries (Perry et al., 2007).
In our data, workers who reported receiving medical benefits from their employer are
coded as formal, and those who did not receive such benefits are coded as informal. If we
do not know whether a worker receives medical benefits, we code as formal workers
whose firm size is greater than 20, government workers, and military workers, and we
code as informal self-employed workers, casual workers, and workers whose firm size is
less than 20. By law, firms with more than 10 employees are required to provide medical
benefits. However, we use a threshold of 20 employees because the rule may not be strictly
enforced, and the IFLS category for firm size is at 20 employees. In our sample, the
majority of workers in firms with fewer than 20 employees are in firms with fewer than 10
workers (in some years, the exact number of employees of the firm is reported by
respondents). In addition, only 23 % of workers in firms with fewer than 20 employees re-
ported receiving medical benefits, and 58 % of workers in firms with more than 20 em-
ployees reported medical benefits. Therefore, we code as formal private sector workers
with medical benefits, private sector workers whose medical benefit status is unknown but
work in larger firms. We code as informal private sector workers without medical benefits,
casual workers, and workers whose firm size is less than 20 and whose medical benefit sta-
tus is unknown. We find in the data that self-employed respondents are unlikely to report
medical benefits regardless of firm size, so we code self-employed workers as informal
workers.
We create alternative indicators of informality for robustness. The first alternative
definition combines self-employed workers and salaried workers. Under this defin-
ition, formal workers are those with medical benefits, or, if no information on med-
ical benefits is available, those whose firm size is greater than 20, government
workers, and those in the military. Self-employed workers, casual workers, workers
without medical benefits, and workers whose firm size is less than 20 and for whom
we do not have information on medical benefits are coded as informal. The second
alternative definition of informality does not include information on medical bene-
fits, so we use only firm size and separate workers into three categories: salaried for-
mal, salaried informal, and self-employed workers. The third definition assumes all
self-employed workers and workers in firms smaller than 100 employees are infor-
mal. The last alternative definition uses information on medical benefits only.
Workers reporting medical benefits are coded as formal, while those without medical
benefits are informal; we define as missing the formality status of workers for whom
information on medical benefits is not available. This last definition is the most re-
strictive and has the largest fraction of missing values.
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3.1 Summary statistics
On any given year, 13 % of workers moved to a new firm or entered self-employment.
Figure 1 shows the transition matrix for formal, salaried informal, and self-employed
workers in the sample, including those with missing wages or tenure variables. Formal
workers are less likely to switch to informality than informal workers are to switch to
formality. On any given year, on average, 3.4 % of formal workers entered informality
either as a salaried or self-employed worker. For informal salaried workers, an average
of 4 % switched into formality or self-employment. For self-employed workers, an aver-
age of 2.4 % switched into either salaried informal or formal work. Changes between
sectors indicate mobility between the formal and informal sectors, which is consistent
with recent work on sector mobility (Maloney, 2004).
Figure 2 shows hourly wages by employer, occupation, industry, and sector tenure.
Earnings in the first year of tenure tend to be higher than earnings in later years, but this
may be driven by job switches. On average, earnings in the formal sector are higher than
the informal sector. Wage growth appears to be realized after several years of tenure.
Table 1 presents the worker characteristics in the analyzed sample. The analyzed
sample has 820 individuals with non-missing employer, occupation, industry, and sector
tenure (formal salaried or informal salaried), with a total of 1611 individual-year obser-
vations. Hourly wages are in 2007 Rupiah; the overall mean corresponds to Rp. 6700
(USD 0.67). The fraction informal in our sample is 59 %, which is higher than ILO’s
2004 estimate of 47 % workers in the non-agriculture informal sector. This discrepancy
likely arises from measurement error. We do not observe the registration status of the
enterprise in our dataset, and we use a more conservative definition of formality based
on medical benefits and a higher firm size threshold. The average education in the ana-
lyzed sample is 10 years, which is beyond the minimum requirement of 9 years.
Comparing formal and informal workers in our analyzed sample, formal workers earn
Rp. 1100 more (USD 0.11) more than their informal counterparts, which corresponds
to a 30 % difference. This is consistent with the fact that informal workers are often
paid below minimum wage. Furthermore, formal workers are more educated than
informal workers. Formal workers also have slightly higher employer, occupation,
Fig. 1 Transitions out of different formality states. Notes: The line “Formal” represents the probability that
formal workers become either salaried informal or self-employed within a given year. The other two lines
are defined in a similar fashion. Source: IFLS, Authors’ calculations
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industry, and sector tenure. In this sample, informal workers have higher potential
experience, suggesting that they are older than the average formal worker.
4 Estimation
Following Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), we will use the following equation to
estimate the relationship between wages, employer, occupation, industry, and sector
tenure:
ln wageijmnst ¼ β0emp tenijt þ β1I emp tenijt > 1
 þ β2occup tenimt
þ β3ind tenint þ β4sector tenist þ β5pot expit þ β6Xit þ μm
þ νn þ τt þ ∈ it ð1Þ
where ln wageijmnst is the real hourly wage of personiin period t with employer j in occu-
pation m, industry n, and sectors. emp_ten, occup_ten, ind_ten, and sector_ten are the
tenure with the current employer, occupation, industry, and sector, respectively. I(emp_te-
nijt > 1) is an indicator equaling one if the respondent is not in the first year of employ-
ment with the current employer; this is to allow for different returns to tenure past the
Fig. 2 Earnings growth by tenure. Notes: Hourly earnings in 2007 Rupiah (1 USD ~9000 Rupiah)
Table 1 Summary statistics
Analyzed sample Formal Informal
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log hourly wages 8.376 0.845 8.521 0.745 8.274 0.895
Informal 0.587 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Employer tenure 3.313 2.970 3.807 3.253 2.965 2.701
Occupation tenure 3.199 2.912 3.411 3.048 3.051 2.804
Industry tenure 3.996 3.441 4.400 3.656 3.712 3.253
Sector tenure 3.634 3.114 3.748 3.240 3.554 3.021
Potential experience 10.261 10.723 9.039 8.839 11.120 11.799
Married 0.455 0.498 0.447 0.498 0.462 0.499
Education 10.858 2.991 11.595 2.507 10.339 3.189
Province unemployment 8.055 3.641 8.602 3.667 7.670 3.575
N 1616 667 949
Notes: Log hourly wages are in 2007 Rupiah (1 USD ~9000 Rupiah). Tenure variables, education, and potential experience
are in years. Province unemployment from the Indonesian National Statistics Agency (BPS)
Marinescu and Triyana IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:2 Page 8 of 43
first year of employment. pot_ exp is the individual’s potential experience, calculated as
age minus education minus 6. We also include industry and occupation dummies (μm, νn).
Additional characteristics Xit include education, marital status, and province unemploy-
ment rate.7 We include province fixed effects to capture time-invariant province
characteristics and year fixed effects (τt) to capture time-specific shocks. Province un-
employment rate is included to capture variation in the local labor market. Some specifi-
cations also include the square term of employer tenure and education and the square
and cube terms of occupation and industry tenure and potential experience.
The error term ϵit can be decomposed into
it ¼ μi þ λij þ ζim þ ψin þ γis þ νit ð2Þ
where μi is the individual-specific component, λij is the job match component, ζim is
the occupation match component, ψin is the industry match component, γis is the sec-
tor match component, andνit is the error term. These match components are unob-
served, and they may affect wages.
We first use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate Eq. 1. However, workers with
the same observable characteristics may have different wages because of the quality of
the match to their employer, occupation, industry, or sector of employment. These un-
observed match components are likely to be correlated with the tenure variables and
the wages. Workers with higher tenure at their employer or in their occupation, indus-
try, or sector may simply be better matches. For example, a worker who is particularly
productive with a specific employer would not want to switch jobs, leading to high
employer tenure: such a selection bias implies that OLS overestimates the returns to
employer tenure. On the other hand, OLS returns to tenure could also be downward
biased if switching employers, occupation, industry, or sector is costly: indeed, in this
case, wages in the new job would have to be high enough to compensate for the costs
of switching, implying that new jobs are positively selected on wages.
To address this endogeneity problem, we follow the solution proposed by Altonji and
Shakotko (1987) and used by Parent (2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009). We
use the following instrument for occupational tenure for personiin occupation m at
time t:
occupbtenimt ¼ occup tenimt− occup tenim
where occup tenim is the average tenure of individual i during the current spell of
working in occupation m. The squared and cubed terms are defined similarly as
occupbtenimt
 2
¼ occup tenimtð Þ2− occup tenimð Þ2and occupbtenimt
 3
¼ occup tenimtð Þ3−
occup tenimð Þ3 . We use the corresponding instrument for the industry, employer, and
sector tenure variables, as well as the indicator for employer tenure greater than 1,
I(emp_tenijt > 1). By construction, the instrument is correlated with the endogenous
tenure variable and uncorrelated with the error term. Specifically, the instrument sums up
to zero over the sample years in which the worker is in a specific occupation, so it is
uncorrelated with the individual and occupation match-specific error component. The
instrumental variables (IV) strategy allows us to eliminate the potentially endogenous
match-specific component and estimate the returns to employer, occupation, industry,
and sector of employment.
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5 Results
We start with examining the results to employer tenure and potential labor market
experience, following Altonji and Shakotko (1987). We present the OLS results and IV
estimates obtained from two stage least squares in Table 2.8 The first column presents
OLS estimates of the linear model, and the second column presents IV estimates of the
linear model. The relationship between wages and employer tenure is positive and sig-
nificant under both OLS and IV. The relationship between wages and potential experi-
ence is also positive and significant. The coefficient on old job (indicator for employer
tenure > 1) is negative and significant in this analyzed sample, although it is typically
positive in the literature. A positive coefficient is consistent with the quality of the job
match being revealed in the first year on the job or investment in job-specific skills
happening rapidly at the beginning of a job, especially through training (Kambourov
and Manovskii,2009). However, this may not be the case if investment in job-specific
skills happens slowly in Indonesia. This may be especially true in the informal sector,
Table 2 Returns to employer tenure
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log hourly wage OLS IV OLS IV
Employer tenure 0.016* 0.039*** −0.002 0.008
(0.009) (0.011) (0.024) (0.029)
Employer tenure2 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Potential experience 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.025** 0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012)
Potential experience2 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Potential experience3 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Employer tenure >1 −0.123** −0.111** −0.107* −0.056
(0.049) (0.055) (0.060) (0.066)
Married 0.173*** 0.141*** 0.132*** 0.115**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049)
Education 0.105*** 0.104*** −0.095*** −0.100***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.032) (0.031)
Education2 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002)
Province unemployment −0.015 −0.017 −0.022 −0.024
Rate (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 1616 1616 1616 1616
R-squared 0.299 0.293 0.320 0.314
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity
Chi2 0.008 0.007
F 0.009 0.008
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Occupation, industry, province, and year
fixed effects are included. Cols. 3 and 4 include employer tenure squared, potential experience squared and cubed, and
education squared
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where there is not much training at the beginning of the employment. Worker
demographics also affect wages: the point estimates are similar under OLS and IV. For
example, the estimated return to education is about 10 %, similar to the estimate for
the USA.
We next explore the returns to employer tenure using non-linear terms in tenure.
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 presents OLS and IV estimates of the basic
model with higher order terms: the squared term of employer tenure, squared and
cubed terms of potential experience, and the squared term of years of education. Table
4 shows that the implied returns to 10 years of employer tenure and labor market
experience are essentially unaffected by including these higher order terms, and this is
true in both the OLS and IV specifications.9 The 10-year returns to employer tenure
range between 23 and 28 %.
Unlike Altonji and Shakotko’s estimates, our IV estimates of the returns to employer
tenure are higher than our OLS estimates. Why are OLS returns to tenure upward
biased in the USA and downward biased in Indonesia? We must remind ourselves that
the IV strategy we used corrects for bias due to match-specific components. In the
USA, OLS estimates of the returns to employer tenure (after accounting for potential
labor market experience) are higher than IV estimates. This suggests that old jobs have
higher match-specific components than new jobs: part of the reason why high tenure
jobs pay more is that they are better matches. By contrast, in Indonesia, IV estimates of
returns to tenure are higher than OLS estimates, suggesting that old jobs have lower
match-specific components than new jobs. This would arise if there are high returns to
employer tenure or if employer switching is generally costly. Indeed, if there are high
returns to employer tenure, there are high opportunity costs to switching employers.
Therefore, workers will only switch to a new employer if wages are high enough to
compensate them for any costs of employer switching, i.e., the match-specific com-
ponent in the new job is higher than in the old job. Consistent with the idea that
employer switching is costly in Indonesia, job mobility in Indonesia is lower than in the
USA or even in Mexico (Maloney, 1999). Overall, OLS estimates are downward biased
in Indonesia and upward biased in the USA because employer switching is more costly
in Indonesia.
Having examined the returns to employer tenure, we proceed to a more general
specification, which allows for returns to additional types of human capital. Table 3
presents the full model: it includes employer, occupation, industry tenure, and sector
tenure. The first two columns estimate the model using linear terms only, and the last
two columns include higher order terms. Odd columns present OLS estimates and the
even columns present IV estimates. We note that, all else equal, being in the informal
sector is associated with a 13 % lower wage rate, consistent with prior literature
showing that informal jobs tend to pay lower wages (Perry et al., 2007).
In Table 4, we compare the returns to different types of human capital in linear and
non-linear specifications by calculating the 10-year returns based on the coefficients in
Tables 2 and 3. Columns 1 to 4 correspond to the models in Table 2, and columns 5 to
8 correspond to models in Table 3. The 10-year return to employer tenure is higher
under IV than OLS. When we include occupation, industry, and sector tenure, the
returns to employer tenure are less precisely estimated (cols. 6 and 8) but of the same
magnitude as in the simpler specification (cols. 2 and 4). The estimated 10-year return
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Table 3 Returns to sector tenure
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log hourly wage OLS IV OLS IV
Employer tenure 0.010 0.038** −0.007 0.006
(0.011) (0.015) (0.033) (0.046)
Employer tenure2 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Occupation tenure −0.013 −0.015 0.027 0.164**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.057) (0.072)
Occupation tenure2 −0.007 −0.029**
(0.010) (0.012)
Occupation tenure3 0.000 0.001**
(0.000) (0.001)
Industry tenure 0.005 0.009 0.130** 0.108
(0.010) (0.014) (0.062) (0.081)
Industry tenure2 −0.016* −0.013
(0.009) (0.011)
Industry tenure3 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Potential experience 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.020* 0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013)
Potential experience2 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Potential experience3 −0.000 −0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Sector tenure 0.007 0.006 −0.122** −0.187**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.061) (0.077)
Sector tenure2 0.017* 0.027***
Sector tenure3 (0.009) (0.010)
−0.001 −0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Employer tenure >1 −0.130*** −0.120** −0.126* −0.081
(0.049) (0.056) (0.070) (0.076)
Informal −0.156*** −0.132*** −0.156*** −0.132***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Married 0.171*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.112**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049)
Education 0.101*** 0.101*** −0.103*** −0.109***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.032) (0.032)
Education2 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002)
Province unemployment −0.016 −0.018 −0.020 −0.023
Rate (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
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to potential experience is consistently positive and significant under OLS and IV. The
10-year returns to potential experience are about 13 % under the linear specification
and 18 % under the non-linear specification. The returns to occupation, industry, and
sector tenure are not statistically significant.
Although we do not find sector tenure to be an important source of wage growth in
Indonesia, we suspect that this may mask heterogeneous effects. Indeed, returns to ten-
ure in the formal sector may be larger than returns to tenure in the informal sector.
Since formal jobs tend to be in the more modern sectors of the economy, it may be
that there is more to learn in these types of jobs compared to informal jobs. To esti-
mate the returns to sector tenure in the formal and informal sectors separately, Table 5
includes an interaction term between sector tenure and an indicator for an informal
job. We use the linear specification to facilitate the interpretation of the results. The
first column of Table 5 presents OLS results; the second column presents IV results.
The relationship between wages and formal sector tenure is positive and significant,
while the interaction term between tenure and informality is negative and significant.
These estimates suggest that tenure in formality positively affects wage growth.
In Table 6, we compute the 10-year returns to different types of human capital when
we allow returns to sector to differ in formal and informal jobs. The first column of
Table 3 Returns to sector tenure (Continued)
Observations 1616 1616 1616 1616
R-squared 0.306 0.298 0.331 0.320
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity
Chi2 0.007 0.000
F 0.008 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Occupation, industry, province, and year
fixed effects are included. Cols. 3 and 4 include employer tenure squared, potential experience squared and cubed,
sector tenure squared and cubed, and education squared
Table 4 10-year returns to tenure
Table 2 Table 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Employer 0.035 0.281** 0.017 0.242** −0.027 0.256* −0.021 0.234
(0.069) (0.101) (0.074) (0.110) (0.102) (0.142) (0.121) (0.185)
Occupation −0.130 −0.146 −0.119 −0.075
(0.081) (0.120) (0.084) (0.127)
Industry 0.055 0.091 0.197** 0.235
(0.100) (0.144) (0.130) (0.202)
Potential experience 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.226** 0.176** 0.139*** 0.128*** 0.201** 0.137*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.079) (0.080) (0.028) (0.028) (0.080) (0.082)
Sector 0.071 0.060 −0.081 −0.139
(0.084) (0.127) (0.111) (0.169)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Calculations based on coefficients in
corresponding columns of Table 2 and Table 3
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Table 6 presents 10-year returns under OLS, and column 2 presents IV estimates; these
estimates are based on the coefficients in Table 5. In the formal sector, under OLS,
there is a 25 % return to sector tenure. Under IV, the estimated 10-year return to
formal sector tenure is 35 %. Consistent with earlier results, the estimated return to po-
tential experience is 14 and 13 % under OLS and IV, respectively. There are no statisti-
cally significant returns to employer, occupation, or industry tenure under either OLS
or IV. The fact that we find no significant returns to employer tenure when accounting
for returns to tenure in the formal sector suggests that some of the wage growth due to
employer tenure is really wage growth associated with tenure in the formal sector. On
the other hand, in the informal sector, the 10-year returns to sector tenure are small
and not statistically significant under either OLS or IV. Overall, although we find no
significant returns to sector tenure in general, returns to formal sector tenure are
Table 5 Returns to tenure by sector
Dependent variable (1) (2)
Log hourly wage OLS IV
Employer tenure 0.005 0.026*
(0.011) (0.015)
Occupation tenure −0.013 −0.012
(0.008) (0.012)
Industry tenure 0.004 0.006
(0.010) (0.014)
Potential experience 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003)
Sector tenure 0.025** 0.035**
(0.010) (0.015)














Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity
Chi2 0.006
F 0.007
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Occupation, industry, province, and year
fixed effects are included
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significant. This provides evidence that formal jobs use more specific skills than infor-
mal jobs.
To summarize our results about the returns to different types of specific human cap-
ital, we find a strong return to tenure in the formal sector, but no significant return to
tenure in the informal sector. Our estimates of 10-year returns to employer, occupa-
tion, industry, and sector tenure indicate that formal sector tenure matters more than
other specific human capital, namely employer or occupation tenure. In addition to the
strong return to formal sector tenure, we find significant returns to potential experi-
ence with and without controlling for sector tenure, which is consistent with previous
findings in the literature.
In Table 7, we compare our findings to earlier estimates in the literature. Our esti-
mated returns to employer tenure in a specification that does not include other sources
of specific human capital are in the high range compared to what was found before.
Our estimates are similar to US estimates of returns to employer tenure by Topel
(1991) and Beffy et al. (2006) (panel A). Our estimated return to potential experience is
lower than estimates for the USA, UK, France, and Germany. Indeed, within these
developed countries, estimated returns to potential experience range from 25 to 82 %
(Altonji and Williams, 2005; Dustmann and Pereira, 2007; Beffy et al., 2006). Since
Lagakos et al. (2012) find that the returns to experience are lower in developing countries,
it is plausible that our relatively low estimate of 13 % reflects differences between a
developing country and developed countries.
In panel B of Table 7, we compare our estimates for the returns to different types of
specific human capital to earlier estimates. In contrast to prior estimates for the USA,
we do not find a positive return to occupation tenure. Although noisy, our point esti-
mate on the return to industry tenure is in line with earlier estimates. We conclude
that in Indonesia, returns to formal sector employment play a key role in wage growth
and returns to other types of specific capital are much lower.















Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Calculations based on coefficients in
corresponding columns of Table 5
* show the statistical significance levels
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Table 7 Comparison to previous literature
Panel A.











Beffy et al. (2006) Beffy et al.
(2006)
Indonesia USA USA USA UK Germany USA France
Employer 0.242 0.074 0.246 0.130 .054 NS −0.004 NS 0.347 −0.002 NS
Potential experience 0.176 0.364 0.372 0.821 0.347 0.246 0.458
Panel B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Marinescu and
Triyana (2016)
Parent (2000) Parent (2000) Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009)
Sullivan (2010)
10 years NLSY PSID 8-years 5-years
Employer 0.158 NS 0.006 NS −0.059
Occupation −0.116 NS 0.111 0.133
Industry 0.060 NS 0.131 0.093 0.063 0.049
Potential experience 0.132 0.236
Formal sector 0.352
Informal sector −0.085 NS

















Table 8 Returns by sector using alternative definitions of informality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Informal: self-employed and salaried
informal in same category




Informal: based on medical
benefits only
Log hourly wage OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Employer tenure 0.007 0.033** 0.017 0.031* 0.007 0.021 0.007 −0.004
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
Occupation tenure −0.018** −0.014 −0.014 −0.004 −0.010 −0.006 −0.017* −0.011
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
Industry tenure 0.008 0.009 0.016 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.027
(0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
Potential experience 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0 .013*** 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Sector tenure 0.020* 0.021 −0.007 −0.001 0.018* 0.034** 0.034*** 0.027*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Informal × tenure −0.033*** −0.047*** −0.000 −0.008 −0.026** −0.036** −0.040*** −0.041**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Informal −0.030 0.040 −0.116* −0.075 −0.080 −0.029 −0.063 −0.042
(0.060) (0.065) (0.062) (0.069) (0.058) (0.061) (0.081) (0.082)
Employer tenure >1 −0.128** −0.114** −0.134*** −0.114** −0.102** −0.099* −0.156** −0.087
(0.050) (0.057) (0.050) (0.057) (0.049) (0.056) (0.072) (0.078)
Married 0.157*** 0.120** 0.164*** 0.135*** 0.175*** 0.139*** 0.275*** 0.241***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.061) (0.061)
Education 0.106*** .105*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.108*** 0.107***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)

















Table 8 Returns by sector using alternative definitions of informality (Continued)
Rate (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 1513 1513 1575 1575 1615 1615 945 945
R-squared 0.327 0.319 0.292 0.287 0.303 0.296 0.337 0.333
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity
Ch i 2 0.0013 0.0893 0.0359 0.1921
F 0.0016 0.1003 0.0409 0.2142

















For robustness, Table 8 presents results using alternative definitions of informality. We
also use the linear specification from Table 5 to facilitate the interpretation of the results.
Columns 1 and 2 use information on medical benefits and firm size, but we combine self-
employed and salaried informal workers into the same category. Columns 3 and 4 do not
use information on medical benefits, but only firm size to define salaried informality.
Columns 5 and 6 assume all self-employed and workers in firms with less than 100 em-
ployees are informal. Columns 7 and 8 only use medical benefits to define informality.
The 10-year returns calculated in Table 9 correspond to the columns in Table 8. The
sample size is notably smaller in this table, especially in columns 7 and 8. These estimates
are noisier compared to results in Table 5, but the results are generally similar.
The estimates of 10-year returns to different types of human capital using alternative
definitions of informality are presented in Table 9. These estimates are noisy, but they
are for the most part qualitatively similar to our earlier estimates using our preferred
definition presented in Table 6. Estimated 10-year returns to employer, occupation, and
industry tenure are not significant under any of the alternative definitions. On the other
hand, the point estimates of returns to employer tenure for two alternative definitions
of informality (cols. 2 and 6) are positive and very similar in magnitude to our main
specification. The returns to employer tenure using the final definition of informality
based on medical benefits only are smaller, but they may be hard to estimate given a
much smaller and selected sample size (col. 8). As for returns to sector tenure, IV esti-
mates of 10-year returns in the formal sector are similar in magnitude to our main esti-
mates, except for the definition of informality that does not use medical benefits (col. 4).
Using medical benefits only, the estimated 10-year return in the formal sector is a signifi-
cant 27 %, similar to our estimate of 35 % using the preferred definition of formality.
The definition of informality and formality matters for the estimation of returns
to sector tenure. Specifically, we find that firm size is not a very good proxy for
formality. It is true that firm size is highly predictive of benefit provision, with
larger firms more likely to provide benefits, but there are still plenty of small
firms that are formal and large firms that are informal if informality is defined
according to health benefit provision. Indeed, among observations used to
estimate regressions underlying column 4 (Table 8), we find that 14 % of very
small firms (4 workers or fewer) provide health benefits and are therefore formal
according to this definition, while 22 % of very large firms (100 workers or more)
do not provide health benefits and are therefore informal.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that returns to employer tenure in Indonesia are higher than
in the USA and other developed countries. By contrast, returns to experience are lower in
Indonesia than in developed countries. Furthermore, in Indonesia, returns to employer
tenure are larger than returns to experience, and our estimates of returns to employer
tenure are unaffected when we account for returns to other types of human capital, such
as occupation and industry-specific human capital. As in many developing countries,
informality is quite prevalent in Indonesia. We test for returns to sector-specific human
capital and find that only formality offers positive returns. Overall, we conclude that
employer tenure and formal sector tenure are the main sources of wage growth in
Indonesia, with general labor market experience playing a smaller but significant role.
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Table 9 10-year returns using alternative definitions of informality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Informal: self-employed and
salaried informal in same category






OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Employer −0.061 0.218 0.036 0.196 −0.028 0.114 −0.089 −0.128
(0.105) (0.149) (0.118) (0.170) (0.099) (0.140) (0.117) (0.145)
Occupation −0.181** −0.136 −0.136 −0.037 −0.097 −0.056 −0.166* −0.110
(0.083) (0.125) (0.083) (0.125) (0.080) (0.119) (0.098) (0.138)
Industry 0.082 0.092 0.163 0.125 0.018 0.009 0.013 0.266
(0.108) (0.152) (0.104) (0.146) (0.100) (0.141) (0.141) (0.186)
Potential experience 0.150*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.135*** 0.127*** 0.038 0.012
(0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.037) (0.039)
Formal 0.197* 0.206 −0.070 −0.006 0.183* 0.344** 0.343** 0.265*
(0.107) (0.152) (0.133) (0.193) (0.103) (0.148) (0.118) (0.147)
Informal −0.137 −0.265** −0.073 −0.089 −0.080 −0.014 −0.056 −0.145
(0.098) (0.132) (0.113) (0.157) (0.091) (0.126) (0.123) (0.142)

















From a policy perspective, our results suggest that, for countries that wish to increase
the prevalence of formal employment, it may be effective to offer incentives to young
people to be employed formally. Indeed, we have found that there are high returns to
tenure in the formal sector of the economy. Therefore, once someone has been
working in formal jobs for a while, positive returns to tenure in the formal sector make
it less attractive to switch to the informal sector, even in the absence of government
provided incentives. This implies that a temporary incentive to work formally may
permanently increase the level of formality in a country.
By examining the sources of wage growth in Indonesia, we have found that they
are quite different from the sources of wage growth in developed countries.
Additional research is required to determine whether this pattern is specific to Indonesia
or is more generally prevalent across other developing countries. Future research should
also investigate the reasons why sources of wage growth in developing countries such as
Indonesia differ from sources of wage growth in developed countries. Such an
investigation is fundamental to further our understanding of income growth in developing
countries.
Endnotes
1Legal status can take the form of PN, Perum, Perusahaan Daerah/PD (different types of
government-owned enterprise), PT, PT/NV, CV, Firma (different types of limited liability
firms), Koperasi (cooperative), and Yayasan (foundation). In 1996, the definition of legal
status is expanded to include SIPD (for quarrying), Diparda (regional government
enterprise), and enterprises with a Governor/Bupati (Head of the Regency)/Mayor permit
or decision.
22010 ILO Report (http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—asia/—ro-bangkok/—
ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_145402.pdf )
3Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja
4By 2005, the government health insurance scheme Jamsostek covered less than 5 %
of eligible workers (workers employed by legal entities, i.e., formal sector), and only
about 4 million of the 56 million in the workforce reported having private health insur-
ance (Setiana2010).
5The IFLS provinces include Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java,
Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, North Sumatra, West
Sumatra, South Sumatra, and Lampung. Fourteen provinces were excluded due to cost
considerations given the size and terrain of the country. The eastern provinces of East
Nusa Tenggara, East Timor, Maluku and Irian Jaya were excluded due to the cost of
fieldwork in these more remote provinces. East Timor is now an independent state.
Aceh was excluded out of concern for the area’s political violence.
6Conditional on our sample selection criteria, the overwhelming majority of workers
have non-missing employer tenure. However, occupation and industry tenure are missing
for about half of the sample (see Figure A.1). We compare the estimated returns using the
non-restricted sample of 5138 observations and the analyzed sample in the sample below
and find that the returns to employer tenure (17 vs. 24 % using the analyzed sample) and
potential experience are slightly lower (12 vs. 18 % using the analyzed sample), but they
are within the confidence intervals of the estimates of our analyzed sample.
7Results without these controls are qualitatively similar.
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8First-stage results are available in the Appendix.
9The returns to employer tenure are calculated as10 βþ γ , whereβ is the tenure
coefficient and γ is the coefficient on the indicator for employer >1 year. Returns to
potential experience (and other tenure variables) are given by 10 β , where β is the
coefficient on potential experience (and other tenure variables).
10http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/data/panel.html
11Although firms with more than workers are required to provide medical benefits,
and should be formal, we find that self-employed people with 10 or more workers
report no medical benefits. Thus, self-employed workers with more than 10 workers
are still considered informal in this dataset. The results are not sensitive to this
difference in definition.
1270 % of workers in firms with fewer than 20 workers are in firms with 10 or fewer
workers.
Appendix
Fig. 3 Sample selection. Notes: Tenure variables include employer, occupation, industry, and sector tenure.
The analyzed sample includes formal salaried and informal salaried workers
Table 10 Sample selection: non-missing employer tenure and non-missing industry and
occupation tenure
Log hourly wages Formal Potential experience Age Married Education
Non-missing industry,
occupation tenure
−0.008 0.011 −0.012*** −0.013*** −0.290*** 0.020***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.002)
Notes: We restrict the sample to respondents with non-missing employer tenure, resulting in 5138 observations. The next
restriction is non-missing industry and occupation tenure. This results in 2609 observations. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 11 First-stage regressions: returns to employer tenure
Panel A. Linear model
Endogenous variable (1) (2)
Employer tenure Employer tenure >
Employer tenure 0.690*** −0.012***
(0.027) (0.003)
Potential experience 0.034*** 0.003***
(0.004) (0.001)










Panel B. Non-linear model
Endogenous variable (1) (2) (3)
Employer tenure Employer tenure2 Employer tenure >1
Employer tenure 0.678*** −2.546* −0.024***
(0.090) (1.385) (0.006)
Employer tenure2 0.001 0.895*** 0.001**
(0.007) (0.115) (0.000)
Potential experience 0.140*** 1.378*** 0.020***
(0.015) (0.179) (0.003)
Potential experience2 −0.003*** −0.027*** −0.001***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.000)
Potential experience3 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employer tenure >1 0.425*** 5.508*** 1.003***
(0.137) (1.987) (0.012)
Married 0.523*** 5.869*** 0.060***
(0.082) (0.968) (0.014)
Education 0.164*** 2.236*** 0.012*
(0.038) (0.454) (0.006)
Education2 −0.007*** −0.097*** −0.000
(0.002) (0.023) (0.000)
Province unemployment 0.014 0.319 −0.004
Rate (0.027) (0.320) (0.004)
R-squared 0.56 0.59 0.63
F-statistic 35.63 34.29 121.37
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Second-stage results in Table 2. Panel B
includes employer tenure squared, potential experience squared and cubed, and education squared
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Table 12 First-stage regressions: returns to employer, occupation, industry, and sector tenure
Panel A. Linear model
Endogenous variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employer Occupation Industry Sector Employer tenure >1
Employer tenure 1.005*** 0.095 −0.050 −0.208*** 0.034***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.008)
Occupation tenure 0.142*** 0.928*** 0.054 0.084** 0.012**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.005)
Industry tenure −0.072* −0.008 0.953*** 0.031 −0.011
(0.044) (0.048) (0.055) (0.051) (0.008)
Potential experience 0.024*** 0.008 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.002*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
Sector tenure −0.153*** −0.076* −0.074* 0.929*** −0.016**
(0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.006)
Employer tenure >1 0.363** 0.320** 0.262* 0.704*** 1.002***
(0.141) (0.142) (0.149) (0.150) (0.015)
Informal −0.947*** −0.441*** −0.999*** −0.460*** −0.098***
(0.110) (0.106) (0.117) (0.113) (0.016)
Married 0.915*** 0.711*** 1.102*** 1.044*** 0.102***
(0.129) (0.127) (0.138) (0.134) (0.018)
Education 0.020 −0.014 0.025 −0.005 0.002
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.003)
Province unemployment −0.012 0.052 0.013 0.057 −0.006
Rate (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.007)
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.65 0.57 0.64

















Table 12 First-stage regressions: returns to employer, occupation, industry, and sector tenure (Continued)
Panel B. Non-linear model
Endogenous
variable























Employer tenure 0.779*** −2.461 0.163 2.542 36.362* 0.325** 5.038** 75.129* 0.330** 5.464** 86.490** 0.031
(0.150) (1.962) (0.146) (1.698) (21.452) (0.161) (2.530) (39.717) (0.164) (2.526) (39.355) (0.021)
Employer tenure2 0.017 1.124*** −0.003 −0.085 −1.458 −0.026** −0.402** −5.994** −0.034*** −0.498** −7.243** 0.000
(0.011) (0.155) (0.010) (0.128) (1.701) (0.011) (0.189) (3.010) (0.012) (0.196) (3.097) (0.001)
Occupation tenure 0.049 −1.508 0.870*** 2.308 70.284** 0.091 0.408 5.892 0.073 −0.841 −24.604 0.074***
(0.234) (3.391) (0.202) (2.430) (30.854) (0.227) (3.384) (50.875) (0.245) (3.607) (53.279) (0.026)
Occupation tenure2 0.006 0.359 −0.014 0.103 −17.233*** −0.013 −0.135 −2.690 −0.002 0.218 4.747 −0.009**
(0.040) (0.598) (0.034) (0.428) (5.629) (0.038) (0.595) (9.158) (0.042) (0.638) (9.583) (0.004)
Occupation tenure3 0.000 −0.008 0.002 0.048** 1.803*** 0.001 0.013 0.247 0.000 −0.005 −0.122 0.000**
(0.002) (0.028) (0.002) (0.020) (0.280) (0.002) (0.028) (0.436) (0.002) (0.030) (0.460) (0.000)
Industry tenure 0.093 4.078 0.041 0.951 16.320 0.187 −4.832 −5.883 0.723*** 10.064** 134.044** −0.105***
(0.228) (3.323) (0.185) (1.922) (22.267) (0.238) (3.580) (54.697) (0.277) (4.119) (62.132) (0.032)
Industry tenure2 −0.016 −0.562 −0.023 −0.339 −4.976 0.071* 1.190** −3.408 −0.114*** −1.570** −20.905** 0.014***
(0.034) (0.516) (0.026) (0.278) (3.364) (0.037) (0.598) (9.539) (0.042) (0.663) (10.277) (0.004)
Industry tenure3 0.000 0.017 0.001 0.021* 0.297* −0.001 0.008 1.265*** 0.005** 0.066** 0.889* −0.001***
(0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.012) (0.157) (0.002) (0.028) (0.451) (0.002) (0.030) (0.481) (0.000)
Potential experience 0.184*** 1.918*** 0.095*** 0.881*** 8.015*** 0.250*** 2.838*** 32.187*** 0.206*** 2.127*** 21.902*** 0.021***
(0.027) (0.310) (0.027) (0.276) (3.022) (0.029) (0.355) (4.484) (0.028) (0.347) (4.517) (0.004)
Potential experience2 −0.006*** −0.062*** −0.003*** −0.028** −0.260** −0.008*** −0.093*** −1.055*** −0.007*** −0.065*** −0.588** −0.001***
(0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.012) (0.131) (0.001) (0.016) (0.203) (0.001) (0.017) (0.229) (0.000)

















Table 12 First-stage regressions: returns to employer, occupation, industry, and sector tenure (Continued)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Sector tenure 0.469** 5.947** 0.263 2.191 17.103 0.403** 4.819* 59.537 0.081 −7.253** −45.638 0.066**
(0.192) (2.441) (0.176) (1.799) (20.696) (0.202) (2.782) (41.180) (0.241) (3.543) (52.817) (0.034)
Sector tenure2 −0.077*** −0.876** −0.035 −0.228 −1.018 −0.061** −0.723* −9.301 0.099** 1.635*** 2.318 −0.013***
(0.027) (0.371) (0.025) (0.270) (3.346) (0.028) (0.419) (6.432) (0.039) (0.614) (9.523) (0.004)
Sector tenure3 0.002** 0.025 0.001 0.001 −0.050 0.002 0.021 0.287 −0.003* −0.021 0.899* 0.001***
(0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.012) (0.153) (0.001) (0.018) (0.288) (0.002) (0.030) (0.482) (0.000)
Employer tenure >1 −0.116 −1.911 0.006 −2.425 −52.885** 0.083 −2.031 −68.234 0.212 −0.444 −46.268 0.983***
(0.211) (2.542) (0.208) (2.203) (24.931) (0.220) (2.969) (42.231) (0.231) (3.084) (43.360) (0.026)
Informal −0.847*** −9.740*** −0.366*** −4.022*** −45.119*** −0.860*** 10.602*** 24.954*** −0.342*** −4.870*** 61.468*** −0.089***
(0.109) (1.291) (0.106) (1.104) (12.213) (0.112) (1.364) (17.491) (0.112) (1.352) (17.286) (0.016)
Married 0.595*** 7.235*** 0.516*** 5.824*** 66.082*** 0.611*** 7.688*** 98.061*** 0.643*** 8.460***1 10.001*** 0.062***
(0.130) (1.552) (0.140) (1.526) (17.754) (0.138) (1.716) (22.758) (0.136) (1.649) (21.135) (0.020)
Education 0.235*** 4.179*** 0.116 1.210 9.337 0.203** 3.683*** 52.923*** 0.263*** 4.385*** 60.189*** −0.022
(0.090) (1.073) (0.089) (0.945) (10.543) (0.092) (1.119) (14.314) (0.088) (1.094) (14.256) (0.013)
Education2 −0.010** −0.192*** −0.006 −0.072 −0.647 −0.008* −0.165*** −2.441*** −0.013*** −0.216*** −2.967*** 0.001*
(0.004) (0.049) (0.004) (0.045) (0.495) (0.004) (0.052) (0.655) (0.004) (0.050) (0.642) (0.001)
Province unemployment −0.016 −0.089 0.031 0.299 3.228 −0.006 0.043 0.940 0.070 0.823 10.333 −0.007
Rate (0.045) (0.549) (0.044) (0.481) (5.510) (0.047) (0.593) (7.877) (0.048) (0.592) (7.823) (0.007)
R-squared 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.66 0.73 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.65
F-statistic 32.89 25.47 29.97 28.64 25.30 66.91 59.82 50.68 41.25 29.75 21.46 103.22
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Second-stage results in Table 3. Panel B includes employer tenure squared, potential experience squared and cubed, sector tenure squared

















Table 13 First-stage regressions: returns to tenure by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer tenure Occupation tenure Industry tenure Sector tenure Sector tenure × informal Employer tenure >1
Employer tenure 1.026*** 0.069 −0.050 −0.216*** −0.122** 0.036***
(0.057) (0.067) (0.063) (0.062) (0.052) (0.008)
Occupation tenure 0.136*** 0.935*** 0.054 0.086** 0.037 0.011**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.029) (0.005)
Industry tenure −0.067 −0.015 0.953*** 0.029 0.020 −0.010
(0.044) (0.048) (0.055) (0.051) (0.040) (0.008)
Potential experience 0.024*** 0.008 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.015** 0.002*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.001)
Sector tenure −0.205*** −0.014 −0.073 0.949*** 0.061 −0.021***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.056) (0.061) (0.039) (0.007)
Informal × Sector tenure 0.070 −0.083* −0.001 −0.027 0.805*** 0.008
(0.051) (0.049) (0.047) (0.052) (0.038) (0.005)
Informal −0.930*** −0.461*** −0.999*** −0.466*** 3.498*** −0.097***
(0.112) (0.107) (0.118) (0.116) (0.075) (0.016)
Employer tenure >1 0.330** 0.358** 0.263* 0.716*** 0.367*** 0.999***
(0.145) (0.144) (0.151) (0.151) (0.116) (0.016)
Married 0.914*** 0.712*** 1.102*** 1.045*** 0.450*** 0.102***
(0.129) (0.127) (0.138) (0.134) (0.107) (0.018)
Education 0.020 −0.015 0.025 −0.005 −0.043** 0.002
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.003)

















Table 13 First-stage regressions: returns to tenure by sector (Continued)
Rate (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.036) (0.007)
R-squared 0.573 0.572 0.648 0.637 0.574 0.713
F-statistic 29.77 24.35 50.07 19.6 30.31 64.94

















Table 14 First-stage regressions: informal: self-employed and salaried informal in same category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer tenure Occupation tenure Industry tenure Sector tenure Sector tenure × informal Employer tenure >1
Employer tenure 1.011*** 0.085 −0.033 −0.190*** −0.092* 0.037***
(0.058) (0.068) (0.063) (0.062) (0.051) (0.008)
Occupation tenure 0.126*** 0.909*** 0.046 0.050 0.007 0.010**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.030) (0.005)
Industry tenure −0.089* −0.007 0.917*** −0.001 −0.003 −0.017**
(0.047) (0.050) (0.057) (0.054) (0.041) (0.008)
Potential experience 0.032*** 0.011 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.019** 0.002**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
Sector tenure −0.179*** −0.040 −0.071 0.968*** 0.056 −0.018***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.056) (0.061) (0.040) (0.007)
Informal × sector tenure 0.076 −0.087* −0.017 −0.041 0.792*** 0.007
(0.051) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) (0.038) (0.005)
Informal −0.863*** −0.415*** −0.930*** −0.209* 3.747*** −0.084***
(0.115) (0.111) (0.120) (0.119) (0.080) (0.017)
Employer 10 0.320** 0.375** 0.257* 0.726*** 0.379*** 1.001***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.153) (0.154) (0.118) (0.016)
Married 0.978*** 0.785*** 1.204*** 1.283*** 0.681*** 0.112***
(0.135) (0.132) (0.144) (0.140) (0.112) (0.019)
Education 0.017 0.004 0.033 −0.007 −0.045** 0.002

















Table 14 First-stage regressions: informal: self-employed and salaried informal in same category (Continued)
Province unemployment −0.009 0.069 0.016 0.053 0.025 −0.003
Rate (0.048) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051) (0.038) (0.007)
R-squared 0.5831 0.578 0.66 0.596 0.7347 0.649
F-statistic 29.48 47.41 56.19 83.18 510 120.51

















Table 15 First-stage regressions: informal: not using information on medical benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer tenure Occupation tenure Industry tenure Sector tenure Sector tenure × informal Employer tenure >1
Employer tenure 0.947*** 0.077 −0.087 −0.153** −0.072 0.029***
(0.061) (0.071) (0.068) (0.072) (0.060) (0.009)
Occupation tenure 0.150*** 0.910*** 0.067* 0.104** 0.043 0.013***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.030) (0.005)
Industry tenure −0.079* −0.040 0.940*** −0.042 −0.032 −0.009
(0.044) (0.051) (0.056) (0.053) (0.040) (0.008)
Potential experience 0.020** 0.010 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.015** 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.001)
Sector tenure −0.081 −0.016 −0.012 0.957*** 0.041 −0.013
(0.059) (0.069) (0.065) (0.070) (0.050) (0.009)
Informal × sector tenure 0.021 0.003 −0.028 0.001 0.838*** 0.002
(0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.051) (0.037) (0.005)
Informal −0.861*** −0.316*** −0.853*** −0.405*** 3.705*** −0.087***
(0.118) (0.113) (0.124) (0.124) (0.081) (0.017)
Employer tenure >1 0.333** 0.346** 0.301* 0.488*** 0.233* 1.001***
(0.149) (0.148) (0.156) (0.155) (0.120) (0.016)
Married 0.901*** 0.682*** 1.033*** 1.083*** 0.482*** 0.104***
(0.134) (0.129) (0.143) (0.140) (0.111) (0.019)
Education 0.011 −0.009 0.023 0.026 −0.021 −0.000

















Table 15 First-stage regressions: informal: not using information on medical benefits (Continued)
Province unemployment −0.028 0.063 0.012 0.037 0.038 −0.006
Rate (0.047) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.037) (0.007)
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.64 0.60 0.73 0.64
F-statistic 28.11 22.73 47.06 32.64 70.89 119.58

















Table 16 First-stage regressions: informal: all self-employed and small firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer tenure Occupation tenure Industry tenure Sector tenure Sector tenure × informal Employer tenure >1
Employer tenure 1.030*** 0.073 −0.056 −0.197*** −0.111** 0.036***
(0.054) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063) (0.050) (0.008)
Occupation tenure 0.152*** 0.950*** 0.068* 0.086** 0.037 0.012**
(0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.029) (0.005)
Industry tenure −0.082* −0.033 0.960*** −0.002 −0.027 −0.014*
(0.043) (0.048) (0.055) (0.051) (0.040) (0.008)
Potential experience −0.197*** −0.004 −0.073 0.963*** 0.082** −0.018***
(0.055) (0.059) (0.054) (0.061) (0.035) (0.006)
Sector tenure 0.053 −0.084* −0.031 −0.019 0.823*** 0.006
(0.051) (0.050) (0.048) (0.055) (0.039) (0.005)
Informal × sector tenure 0.023*** 0.009 0.027*** 0.013* 0.008 0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.001)
Informal −0.948*** −0.465*** −0.991*** −0.465*** 3.383*** −0.097***
(0.112) (0.108) (0.118) (0.117) (0.074) (0.016)
Employer tenure >1 0.330** 0.360** 0.269* 0.712*** 0.372*** 1.001***
(0.144) (0.145) (0.151) (0.151) (0.117) (0.016)
Married 0.953*** 0.670*** 1.097*** 1.096*** 0.518*** 0.107***
(0.130) (0.130) (0.140) (0.137) (0.109) (0.018)
Education 0.020 −0.011 0.026 −0.009 −0.054*** 0.001

















Table 16 First-stage regressions: informal: all self-employed and small firms (Continued)
Province unemployment −0.020 0.050 −0.000 0.076 0.060* −0.006
Rate (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.036) (0.007)
R-squared 0.58 0.57 0.65 0.57 0.72 0.64
F-statistic 31.51 24.76 53.44 30.23 67.82 18.01

















Table 17 First-stage regressions: informal: based on medical benefits only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer tenure Occupation tenure Industry tenure Sector tenure Sector tenure × informal Employer tenure >1
Employer tenure 1.337*** 0.114 0.000 −0.152** −0.108** 0.075***
(0.065) (0.096) (0.072) (0.071) (0.055) (0.010)
Occupation tenure 0.038 0.955*** −0.042 0.012 0.005 −0.005
(0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.040) (0.032) (0.005)
Industry tenure −0.178*** −0.038 1.063*** −0.087 −0.036 −0.026**
(0.062) (0.077) (0.072) (0.066) (0.050) (0.010)
Potential experience 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.003**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.001)
Sector tenure −0.160** 0.001 −0.040 1.234*** 0.201*** −0.017**
(0.063) (0.076) (0.064) (0.064) (0.044) (0.007)
Informal × sector tenure 0.044 −0.045 0.025 −0.018 0.826*** 0.007
(0.051) (0.054) (0.048) (0.054) (0.046) (0.005)
Informal −0.925*** −0.520*** −1.021*** −0.890*** 3.458*** −0.067***
(0.136) (0.141) (0.145) (0.143) (0.098) (0.020)
Employer 10 0.255 0.129 0.068 0.502** 0.348** 1.044***
(0.202) (0.203) (0.204) (0.206) (0.158) (0.022)
Married 1.085*** 0.589*** 1.255*** 1.256*** 0.519*** 0.103***
(0.164) (0.174) (0.169) (0.166) (0.133) (0.018)
Education −0.053* −0.019 −0.020 −0.047 −0.065** −0.000

















Table 17 First-stage regressions: informal: based on medical benefits only (Continued)
Province unemployment −0.026 0.107* 0.060 0.025 0.007 −0.002
Rate (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.060) (0.044) (0.007)
R-squared 0.70 0.67 0.75 0.68 0.76 0.72
F-statistic 100.62 789.88 213.87 68.42 52.23 532.84

















Data and documentation for the IFLS can be found at: http://www.rand.org/labor/
FLS/IFLS.html.
The IFLS collects data to study a wide range of behaviors and outcomes for the
Indonesian population. The IFLS is based on a sample of households representing
about 83 % of the Indonesian population living in 13 of the nation’s 26 provinces in
1993. All of the provinces in the main islands of Java and Bali include Jakarta, West
Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, and Bali. The IFLS includes four provinces in
Sumatra: North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, and Lampung. The remaining
provinces are West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi. Other
provinces were excluded because of prohibitive costs. Four surveys have been
conducted in 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007. The first wave (IFLS1) was administered in
1993 to individuals living in 7224 households, comprising over 22,000 individuals. The
sampling approach in the subsequent waves of the IFLS was to re-contact all original
IFLS1 households with living members the last time they had been contacted, plus
split-off households from other waves. IFLS2 consists of 7620 households, and it
succeeded in re-interviewing 94.4 % of IFLS1 households. IFLS3 consists of 10,435
households; it re-contacted 95.3 % of IFLS1 households. IFLS4 consists of 13,536
households; it re-contacted 93.6 % of IFLS1 households. Nearly 91 % of IFLS1
households were interviewed in all waves.
I. Employment types, industry, and occupation codes
1. Employment types
IFLS code Employment type
1 Self employed, no employee
2 Self employed, with unpaid family workers/temporary workers
3 Self employed, with permanent workers
4 Government
5 Private employee
6 Unpaid family worker
7 Casual worker, agriculture
8 Casual worker, non-agriculture
In this paper, we categorize employment type into four categories as follows:















4 Electricity gas water
5 Construction
6 Wholesale, retail, hotel
7 Transportation, communication
8 Finance, insurance, real estate










7X Operation and production
8X Transportation operations
9X Blue collar
M or MM Military
S or SS Students
The IFLS originally used two-digit occupation codes but simplified the codes into
one-digit occupation codes in waves 3 and 4. More detail on occupation list can be
found in Appendix A of the IFLS1 documentation for household questionnaire.
II. Variable construction
Sample construction
We restrict the sample to respondents who were interviewed in at least two
consecutive surveys. We further restrict the sample to males who ever worked between
1988 and 2007 and lived in an urban area in at least one round of the survey.
1. Raw variables
Employment type
We use the following variables on the respondent’s primary job from each wave of
the survey:
Variable Question
IFLS1 TK24A Which category best describes the work that you do?
IFLS2 TK24A Which category best describes the work that you do?
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(Continued)
Variable Question
IFLS1 TK24A Which category best describes the work that you do?
IFLS2 TK24A Which category best describes the work that you do?
IFLS3 TK24A Which category best describes the work that you do?
IFLS4 TK24A Which category best describes the work that you do?
For labor force participation in non-survey years, we use the following retrospective
variables:
Variable Interval Question
IFLS1 TK33 1988–1992 Which category best describes the work that you did?
IFLS2 TK33 1988–1996 Which category best describes the work that you did?
IFLS3 TK33 1996–1999 Which category best describes the work that you did?
IFLS4 TK33 1999–2007 Which category best describes the work that you did?
Employer tenure
The following questions regarding tenure on the same job are asked retrospectively:
Variable Interval Question
IFLS1 TK29 1988–1992 Was your primary job the same as the job in the year of […]?
IFLS2 TK29 1988–1996 Was your primary job the same as the job in the year of […]?
IFLS3 TK29 1996–1999 Was your primary job the same as the job in the year of […]?
IFLS4 TK30 1999–2007 Where did you work? [Check if same employer as previous year]
Industry
We use the following variables on the respondent’s primary job from each wave of
the survey:
Variable Question
IFLS1 TK19a_1 What is manufactured/done at your workplace?
IFLS2 TK20Aind What is manufactured/done at your workplace?
IFLS3 TK19Aa In what field of work is this job?
IFLS4 Tk19ab What is manufactured/done at your workplace?
We use the following retrospective questions for non-survey years:
Variable Interval Question
IFLS1 TK31 1988–1992 What was manufactured/done at your workplace in the year of […]?
IFLS2 TK32ind 1988–1996 What was manufactured/done at your workplace in the year of […]?
IFLS3 TK31Aa 1996–1999 In what field of work was this job?
IFLS4 TK31A 1999–2007 Interviewer’s note: Circle the appropriate field of work
Occupation
We use the following variables on the respondent’s primary job from each wave of
the survey:
Variable Question
IFLS1 Occ12 What are your primary duties at your workplace?
IFLS2 TK20Aocc What are your primary duties at your workplace?
IFLS3 TK20Ab Interviewer’s note: Circle the appropriate code according to primary duties TK20A
IFLS4 occ07tk2 What are your primary duties at your workplace?
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We use the following retrospective questions for non-survey years:
Variable Interval Question
IFLS1 TK32 1988–1992 What were your primary duties in the year of […]?
IFLS2 TK32occ 1988–1996 What were your primary duties in the year of […]?
IFLS3 TK32B 1996–1999 Interviewer’s note: Circle the appropriate code according to primary duties TK32
IFLS4 Occ07 1999–2007 What were your primary duties in the year of […]?
Other variables:
Primary job characteristics
We use the following variables on the respondent’s primary job from each wave of
the survey:
IFLS1 IFLS2 IFLS3 IFLS4
Net salary last month tk25r1_m tk25amt tk25a1 tk25a1
Total monthly income – tk25am – –
Net salary last year tk25r1_y tk25ayt tk25a2 tk25a2
Total annual income – tk25ay – –
Net profit last month tk26r1_m tk26amn tk26amn tk26a1
Gross profit, monthly – tk26amg tk26amg –
Net profit last year tk26r1_y tk26ayn tk26ayn tk26a3
Gross profit, annual – tk26ayg tk26ayg –
Health benefits tk25a1_m tk25ame tk25a3e1 tk25a3e1
Health insurance – – tk25a3e2 tk25a3e2
Health benefits: preferred clinic – – tk25a3e3 tk25a3e3
Number of workers – tk20aa tk20aa tk20aa
Hours last week tk21a tk21a tk21a tk21a
Usual hours worked tk22a tk22a tk22a tk22a
Weeks worked last year tk23a tk23a tk23a tk23a
We use the following retrospective questions for non-survey years:
IFLS1 IFLS2 IFLS3 IFLS4
Monthly income – tk34t tk34 –
Total monthly income – tk34 – –
Monthly profit – tk35n tk35n –
Gross income, monthly – tk35g tk35g –
Hours worked/week – tk36 tk36 –
Weeks worked/year – tk37 tk37 –
Health benefits – tk34e – –
We use the consumer price index (CPI) published in the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) to obtain real income. The IFS calculates CPI based on prices in 17
capital cities; this paper will use 2007 as the base year. We use real monthly wages, and
net monthly profits for self-employed respondents, as income. If monthly income is
not available, we use annual wages divided by 12 and annual profits divided by 12 for
self-employed respondents. Hours per year is constructed based on normal hours
worked multiplied by weeks worked. Real hourly wages is constructed using annual
income divided by hours worked. We use log hourly wages in the analysis.
We recode response to the number of workers to match the categories in IFLS4. The
range is as follows: 1 to 4 workers, 5 to 19 workers, 20 to 99 workers, and more than 100.
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Respondent characteristics
Date of birth is asked every round of the survey; however, we find some
inconsistencies in the responses across waves. First, we take the mean of the maximum
and minimum of the mode of reported birth date and calculate respondent’s age based
on the constructed date of birth. If the difference between the maximum and
minimum of the mode is more than 3 years, but the difference between any two of the
reported dates of birth is less than 1 year, we use these closest dates of birth to
calculate the mean of the birth date.
We define years of education as the maximum of the mode of reported years of
education. Potential experience is defined as current age minus education minus 6. We
drop observations with negative potential experience.
2. Constructing tenure on the job, employment type, industry, and occupation
We reshape the data such that each observation is identified by respondent ID and
year, instead of respondent ID and wave.
Imputations for job characteristics:
If occupation is missing but the industry is agriculture, we impute occupation to be
casual worker. Similarly, if industry is missing but occupation is agriculture, we impute
industry as agriculture. In more than 97 % of cases where both occupation and industry
are available, where occupation is agriculture, industry is agriculture and vice versa.
If respondents report being in the military, we impute the employment type to be
government worker.
If respondents report having the same job but some characteristics (industry, occupation,
or employment type) are missing, we assume the characteristics remain the same.
For each of the variables occupation, industry, and employment type, if one of them is
missing but the two others are the same as in the previous or next year, then we assume
that the missing variable also stays the same. This is not problematic for occupation and
industry because in non-missing cases, the concordance is more than 98 %. For employ-
ment type, the concordance is still very high (90 %) but not quite as high.
We set the same job indicator to zero for the first year of work. We also set the same
job indicator to zero if there is a major job characteristics change (a change in
occupation is not considered a major change).
The number of workers is only asked in survey years. If the number of workers does
not change within a job, we use the reported category of firm size to impute firm size
for non-survey years. If the number of workers changed within a job, we use the re-
ported firm size in the survey year as the firm size. In this case, we assume firm size
does not change in between survey years.
We assume health benefits do not change within a job. Health benefits may be
insurance, medical allowance, or the availability of a preferred provider. If reported
health benefits are inconsistent within one job, we impute health benefits based on the
previous or next year’s reported status.
Tenure variables
We increase tenure on the job so long as the same job indicator is equal to one. If we
have more than 3 consecutive years of missing indicator, we set the indicator to missing
since we do not know the tenure. We may be underestimating tenure without imputation.
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For tenure on employment type, industry and occupation, we use the user-defined
command tsspell10 to count the spell number and sequence number. This command
takes into account the panel structure of the data. Similarly, if there are 3 or more
missing values, we count tenure as missing.
Definitions of informality
Variable med1
Workers with any health benefits are considered formal.
Variable inf1
We define self-employment as informal.11 Government workers and those in the
military are considered formal. Casual workers and workers in firms with fewer than 20
workers are considered informal.12
Variable infM
We take the definition based on medical benefits as in med1 and supplement the
information with inf1.
Variable infM2
We refine our definition based on infM by separating self-employed workers.
Variable inf2
We refine our definition of informality based on inf1 into informal self-employed,
informal not self-employed, and formal workers.
Variable inf2_big
We refine our definition of informality based on inf2 and assume all firms with fewer
than 100 workers are informal.
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